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used on a casual basis by that person.16  Thus, when a
bulldozer is sold to a purchaser who had rented it for three
weeks, the purchaser would not be considered a prior user
since use of the bulldozer was only on a casual basis prior to
purchase.17
Property that is used by the manufacturer (other than for
mere demonstration purposes) for a business use becomes
used property.18 In a 1982 case, helicopters acquired for use
in a logging business had been committed to commercial use
by the manufacturer to test suitability of the machine for
commercial applications.19  In a 1983 private letter ruling,20
use of property for demonstration purposes or for
“commercial evaluation” did not cause property to be
considered used. 21
Reconditioned property
A reconditioned or rebuilt machine is not treated as new
(the original use of the property does not begin with the
taxpayer).22  Thus, a “factory reconditioned” machine has not
been considered to be new inasmuch as the original use did
not commence with the taxpayer. 23  If a taxpayer with an old
combine with an unrecovered basis of $10,000 contracts to
have it reconditioned, or the taxpayer does the
reconditioning, at a cost of $50,000, only the $50,000 was
considered new under the rules governing accelerated
depreciation. 24
In conclusion
The meaning of the term “original use” commencing with
the taxpayer in the context of the 30 percent depreciation
allowance may never be made clear, considering the term
nature of the enactment.  In the meantime, reliance on the
meaning given to the term in the past in the context of
accelerated depreciation and investment tax credit would
appear to be appropriate and reasonable.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS . The defendant was
convicted of cruelty to over 130 animals on the defendant’s
property. The animals were removed by the local animal
rescue league. As part of the defendant’s sentence, the judge
prohibited the defendant from owning more than one
animal, which could not be a horse. The judge also ordered
the sale of the animals, with the proceeds to be paid to the
rescue league as compensation for the care of the animals. If
an animal was sold for less than its fair market value, the
defendant had to pay the difference to the rescue league.
The judge also set a minimal amount of compensation
which had to be paid, whether or not the proceeds of the sale
of the animals met the minimum amount. The defendant
argued that the compensation and sale judgments amounted
to a forfeiture of the animals. The court held that the sale of
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the animals was not without compensation to the defendant
because the proceeds would go toward payment of the
compensation judgment and would fulfill the judgment
which prohibited the defendant from owning more than one
animal. Mahan v. State of Alaska, 51 P.3d 962 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2002).
TRESPASS. A bull owned by the defendant broke
through a fence on a neighbor’s ranch. An employee, the
plaintiff, of the neighbor was injured while helping to
capture and return the bull. The plaintiff sued under a theory
of strict liability created by Montana Code § 81-4-215. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant on
the basis that the statute did not create strict liability for
trespassing animals. The court noted that the statute
modified the common law rule of strict liability for
trespassing animals by creating a “fence out” requirement
for claiming damages from trespassing animals. The statute
required property owners to erect legal fences, as defined in
Montana Code § 81-4-101, in order to bring an action for
trespass. The court also noted that the statute stated that “the
owner of the animals is liable for all damages to the owner
or occupant of the enclosure.” The court held that, although
the statute changed who had the duty to erect the fence, the
statute did not change the strict liability standard of the
common law rule. Therefore, the court held that Montana
Code § 81-4-215 did impose a strict liability standard on
owners whose animals break through a legal fence. The case
was remanded for a determination of the damages. Madrid
v. Zenchiku Land & Livestock, 51 P.3d 1137 (Mont.
2002).
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
SECURED CLAIMS . The debtors, husband and wife,
had obtained a confirmed Chapter 12 plan and had
successfully made all plan payments. The plan provided for
full payment of all secured claims and included two secured
claims held by a bank for loans used to purchase farm land
and farm equipment. The plan provided for annual payments
over 12 and 30 years, with 12 and 14 annual payments made
during the plan. However, the annual payments provided by
the plan would not completely amortize the secured claims
at the stated 10 percent interest. The plan payments would
amortize the claims at only a 8.89 percent interest rate. The
bank argued that the plan also required that the debtors
make additional prepayments. The bank pointed to plan
language which allowed the debtors to make prepayments.
Although the plan language was drafted by the debtors’
counsel, the court refused to interpret this language in the
bank’s favor because the bank had more expertise in
drafting contracts and payment schedules. The court held
that, because the prepayments were not required by the plan,
the bank could not require payments other than those
provided by the plan. The court acknowledged that both
parties had approved of the plan payments in error since the
payments would not completely pay the claims at the stated
interest rate in the stated 12 and 30 years. However, the
court oted that the bank had unreasonably relied on the
pl n prepayment language to protect its claims from
underpayment. Therefore, the court held that the plan
precluded the bank from requiring additional payments
before releasing their claims. Schellhorn v. Farmers
Savings Bank, 280 B.R. 847 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2002).
      FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN . The debtors filed for
Ch pter 11 in January 1989. They reached an agreement
with a bank for the bank to provide a loan of money which
the debtors would use to fund their plan. The agreement
provided that the debtors’ stock in the bank was collateral
for the loan. If the loan was not repaid, the stock was to be
sold to pay the loan. The plan was confirmed in August
1989. In January 1990, the bank sold the stock to pay for the
loan. The gain from the sale of the stock was not included in
the bankruptcy estate’s tax return for 1990. After the case
was closed, the debtors sought to reopen the case to have the
trustee file an amended return to include the gain from the
sale of t  stock in the bankruptcy estate income for 1990.
The court noted that the plan provided for revesting of all
ba kruptcy property to the debtors upon confirmation of the
plan; therefore, the court held that the stock belonged to the
debtors when it was sold in 1990 to pay for the loan. In r
Linsenmeyer, 280 B.R. 828 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2002)
DISCHARGE . The debtor failed to file returns and pay
taxes for 1987 through 1990. The IRS filed substitute
returns and made assessments based on those returns. The
debtor did not sign the returns but did sign an agreement to
pay the taxes in installments. The court held that the taxes
were not dischargeable, under Section 523(a)(1)(B), because
no returns were filed by the debtor. The court held that the
installment agreement could not function as a return because
it did not provide tax return information as it was not signed
under penalty of perjury. In re Brown, 280 B.R. 760
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
APPLES. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
which establish the Apple Market Loss Assistance Payment
Program II which provides direct payments to apple
producers to provide relief due to the low prices received for
the 2000 crop. 67 Fed. Reg. 63242 (Oct. 11, 2002).
COUNTER-CYCLICAL PAYMENTS. The CCC has
issu d final regulations which implement the provisions of
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
regarding direct and counter-cyclical payments for the crop
years 2002 through 2007. These payments provide income
supp rt to producers of eligible commodities and are based
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on historically-based acreage and yields and do not depend
on the current production choices of the farmer. They
replace the Production Flexibility Contract payments made
under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996 for the crop years 1996 through 2002. In addition to
the commodities that were eligible for PFC payments, the
2002 Act also provides for direct and counter-cyclical
payments for peanuts, soybeans, sunflower seed and other
oilseeds. 67 Fed. Reg. 64747 (Oct. 21, 2002).
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiff was a multiple peril
crop insurer who was reinsured through the FCIC. The
plaintiff issued crop insurance policies to farmers for the
1996 crop year. In December 1995, the FCIC issued new
rules governing the prevented planting coverage which
altered policies already issued by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
alleged that the changes increased its costs and liabilities for
the policies issued under the old rules. The plaintiff filed a
claim for these additional costs with the FCIC but the claims
were denied. The ruling was appealed to the Board of
Contract Appeals which upheld the FCIC ruling. The
plaintiff then filed the current case, asking for damages from
breach of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement, violation of
the Federal Crop Insurance Act, and violation of due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The current case
was not filed as a review of the BCA decision. The FCIC
sought dismissal of the case for failure to exhaust
administrative appeals. The court held that the claim for
damages could not be brought as an original action because
the matter had been ruled upon by the BCA; therefore, the
plaintiff could only appeal that decision. The court also held
that the breach of contract claim would not be dismissed
because it would require examination of materials outside
the pleadings. The Fifth Amendment claim was dismissed
because it was identical to the breach of contract claim.
American Growers Ins. Co. v. FCIC, 210 F. Supp.2d
1088 (S.D. Iowa 2002).
LIVESTOCK COMPENSATION PROGRAM. The
FSA has announced the availability of $752 million under
Section 32 of the Act of August 24, 1935 to implement the
2002 Livestock Compensation Program (LCP). Livestock
feed supplies and grazing availability have been
significantly reduced due to the extreme drought that has
occurred throughout much of the United States during 2001
and 2002. The LCP was created by the United States
Department of Agriculture to provide immediate financial
assistance to the producers of eligible beef, dairy, buffalo,
beefalo, sheep or goats, or cash lessees of eligible livestock,
in certain states and counties to offset losses due to drought.
Funds will be provided to eligible applicants in counties
declared under a disaster designation made after January 1,
2001, or submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture, by the
governor of a state or a tribal leader of an Indian
reservation, no later than September 19, 2002. The county
must be approved by the Secretary to be eligible for the
LCP. Complete eligibility criteria and application
procedures are provided in the notice. 67 Fed. Reg. 62871
(Oct. 9, 2002).
LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS . The CCC has
issued final regulations which implement a portion of Title I
of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
relating to the farm commodity price support programs of
the FSA and CCC. The 2002 Act authorizes Marketing
Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments for
peanuts, wool, mohair, pulse crops (lentils, small chickpeas,
dry peas), wheat, feed grains, soybeans and other oilseeds.
Peanuts, wool, mohair and pulse crops, have not been
eligible for these programs prior to enactment of this law
and the final regulations add these new commodities. 67
Fed. Reg. 63505 (Oct. 11, 2002).
TOBACCO . Section 1610 of the Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 changed the reserve stock level for
flue cured tobacco from the greater of 100,000 pounds or 15
percent  of the national quota to the greater of 60,000
pounds or 10 percent of the national quota. The FSA has
issued final regulations which implement this change. 67
Fed. Reg. 62871 (Oct. 9, 2002).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The decedent had
established a charitable remainder annuity trust with the
decedent as annuitant to receive 5 percent of the value of the
trust corpus each year. As the trust was established, the trust
qualified for a charitable deduction. However, during the
four years of the trust’s existence, no distributions were
made to the decedent. At the decedent’s death, the trust
provided for secondary annuitants who would receive the 5
percent payments if the annuitants agreed to pay the estate
taxes resulting from the payments. The secondary
an uitants, except one, declined the annuities. The annuitant
wh  accepted, however, refused to pay any taxes and
thr atened a lawsuit to receive the annuity. The trustee
reached a settlement and agreed to pay the taxes from the
trust. The court held that the estate was not eligible for a
charitable deduction for the trust because the 5 percent
annuity was not paid and the charitable remainder holder did
not receive all the remainder of the trust, because some of
th  rust was used to pay the taxes on the one secondary
annuitan ’s payments. Estate of Atkinson v. Comm’r,
2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,449 (11th Cir. 2002),
ff’g, 115 T.C. 26 (2000).
IRA.  The decedent had owned an IRA and designated a
trust as the beneficiary of the IRA. The beneficiaries of the
trust were the decedent’s three children. The trust
beneficiaries had a testamentary special power to appoint
their share of the trust. The trust share could not be
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appointed to the child, such child's estate, such child's
creditors, the creditors of such child's estate, or any
“disqualified appointee” which included (1) any individual
born in a calendar year prior to the calendar year of birth of
the decedent’s oldest living issue at the time of the
decedent’s death, (2) any person other than a trust or an
individual, or (3) any trust that may have as a beneficiary an
individual born in a calendar year prior to the calendar year
of birth of the decedent’s oldest living issue at the time of
the decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that the life expectancy
of the oldest current trust beneficiary could be used to
determine the pay out period for the IRA for each of the
primary beneficiaries. Ltr. Rul. 200235038, June 4, 2002;
Ltr. Rul. 200235039, date not given; Ltr. Rul.
200235040, June 4, 2002; Ltr. Rul, 200235041, date not
given.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned a
parcel of land with a residence which the taxpayers used for
vacations, family gatherings and entertaining guests. The
property included a vacation residence, a guesthouse, a barn,
a boathouse, two sheds and a large pier and dock The
property was subject to a perpetual conservation easement
which prohibited commercial activities on the land. The
property was similar in size and use to neighboring
properties. The taxpayers transferred their interests in the
property to a trust intended to be a qualified personal
residence trust. The IRS ruled that the property was a




ACCOUNTING METHOD . The taxpayer was a
privately held family C corporation which used the cash
method of reporting income. The taxpayer owned
timberland on which it grew and harvested trees for lumber.
The taxpayer also provided harvesting services on a contract
basis for third party timberland owners. Most of the actual
harvesting was done by third parties under contract to the
taxpayer. The issue was whether the taxpayer was in the
farming business and eligible to use the cash method of
accounting as to the harvesting of trees for itself and others.
The taxpayer argued that the definition of farming in I.R.C.
§ 448(d)(1)(B) included the “raising, harvesting or growing
of trees”; therefore, the harvesting of trees alone was
sufficient to make the taxpayer’s business eligible for the
farming cash method of accounting. In a Chief Counsel
Advice letter, the IRS acknowledged that the use of “or” in
“raising, harvesting or growing of trees” would usually
indicate that each separate activity met the definition of
farming, but ruled that contract harvesting of trees was not a
farming business eligible for cash method reporting because
the taxpayer did not raise the trees harvested. The IRS
pointed out that nowhere in case law, regulations or other
statutory definitions of farming is contract harvesting
considered as farming for income tax purposes. CCA Ltr.
Rul. 200242010, July 8, 2002.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14]. The taxpayer filed a suit against an employer for
age discrimination, alleging violations of the federal and
state age discrimination laws. The petition asked for
damages for fringe benefits, front and back pay, and pain
and suffering. The employer decided to settle the suit and
pay the taxpayer for the front and back pay damages. The
taxpayer accepted the settlement but required that the
settlement agreement allocate all of the payment to pain and
suffering. The court looked beyond the language of the
settlement and found that the settlement amount was
intended by the employer to compensate the taxpayer only
for front and back pay. The court held that the entire
s ttlement was income to the taxpayer because the taxpayer
fail  t  demonstrate that any of the settlement proceeds
was int nded to compensate the taxpayer for personal
injuries. Peaco v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,707 (3d Cir. 2002), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2000-122.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On October 1, 2002, the
President determined that certain areas in Mississippi were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
tropical storm Isidore beginning on September 23, 2002.
FEMA-1436-DR. On October 3, 2002, the president
determined that certain areas in Louisiana were eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of hurricane Lili
beginning on October 1, 2002. FEMA-1437-DR. On
October 9, 2002, the president determined that certain areas
in Alabama were eligible for assistance under the Act as a
result of tropical storm Isidore beginning on September 23,
2002. FEMA-1438-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who
sustained a loss attributable to these disasters may deduct
the loss on his or her 2001 federal income tax return.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS . The taxpayer terminated
employment with a government agency to take another job
with a private company. The taxpayer had accrued vacation
and sick leave days from the old employment and received
money in compensation for those benefits. The taxpayer
argued that the money for the vacation and sick leave days
was excluded from income under I.R.C. § 475 as money
received under a deferred compensation plan. The court held
that, even if the vacation and sick leave benefits were
considered a deferred compensation plan, I.R.C. § 475
required the deferred compensation to be included in
income in the year received. In addition, the court held that,
under I.R.C. § 475(e)(11), the vacation and sick leave
benefits were not a deferred compensation plan. The court
held that the money received for the vacation and sick leave
days was taxable wages. Donohoe v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2002-136.
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD. The taxpayer was married
and lived with the taxpayer’s spouse and their two children
th oughout the tax year. The taxpayer filed a separate return
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and used the head of household filing status. The spouse
also had a small amount of employment income. The court
ruled that the taxpayer could not use the head of household
filing status because the taxpayer was married at the close of
the tax year. The court also held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to the earned income tax credit because the taxpayer
was married and did not file a joint return. Pelayo-Zabalza
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2002-134.
INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS. The IRS has
issued a modified and supplemented list of Indian tribal
governments that are to be treated similarly to states for
specified purposes under the Internal Revenue Code. Rev.
Proc. 2002-64, I.R.B. 2002-__.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayer, a family
partnership, owned farm land in a irrigation district and
owned a right to use water from the district for irrigating the
land. The taxpayers were allowed to sell the water rights
back to the federal government without selling their land.
The taxpayer transferred the water rights to an intermediary
which transferred the water rights to the irrigation district,
used the money to purchase farm land, and transferred the
farm land to the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the
exchange of the water rights for the farm land qualified for
the like-kind exchange deferment of gain under I.R.C. §
1031. The taxpayer argued that the water rights were an
interest in land similar to a fee simple interest in the farm
land. The court found that the water rights were limited by
(1) the total water rights of the irrigation district, (2) the
right of the government to withhold water in times of water
shortages, (3) the priority of nonfarm water users, and (4)
the 50 year limitation on the district’s water rights. The
taxpayer argued that the limitations did not change the
nature of the water right as an interest in real property
because they were similar to a lease. The IRS argued that
Rev. Rul. 55-749, 1955-2 C.B. 295 provides that water
rights limited in amount or duration were not like-kind
property to a fee simple interest in land. The court held that,
because the water rights were limited in amount, priority
and duration, the rights were not like-kind property with a
fee simple interest in farm land. Wiechens v. United States,
2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,708 (D. Ariz. 2002).
The taxpayer was in the business of leasing vehicles.
The taxpayer would acquire vehicles from lessees, sell the
vehicles through a qualified intermediary, and acquire new
vehicles for lease through that intermediary. The IRS ruled
that the acquired vehicles were like-kind property as to the
new vehicles acquired with the proceeds of the acquired
vehicles. Ltr. Rul. 200241013, July 1, 2002.
PENALTIES . The IRS has issued a revenue procedure
which identifies circumstances under which the disclosure
on a taxpayer's return, for 2002 and later, of a position with
respect to an item is adequate for the purpose of reducing
the understatement of income tax under I.R.C. § 6662(d)
(relating to the substantial understatement aspect of the
accuracy-related penalty), and for the purpose of avoiding
the preparer penalty under I.R.C. § 6694(a) (relating to
understatements due to unrealistic positions). Rev. Proc.
2002-66, I.R.B. 2002-42, amending, Rev. Proc. 2001-52,
2001-2 C.B. 491.
PENSION PLANS. Under Rev. Rul. 2002-46, I.R.B.
2002-29, 117, grace period contributions to a qualified cash
or deferred arrangement within the meaning of I.R.C. §
401(k) or to a defined contribution plan as matching
contributions within the meaning of I.R.C. § 401(m) are not
deductible by the employer for a taxable year if the
contributions are attributable to compensation earned by
plan participants after the end of that taxable year.
Taxpayers wishing to change to a method consistent with
Rev. Rul. 2002-46 must apply for automatic approval under
Rev. Proc. 2002-9, I.R.B. 2002-3, 327. Rev. Rul. 2002-46
provides that the scope limitations in section 4.02 of Rev.
Proc. 2002-9 do not apply to a change to a method
consistent with Rev. Rul. 2002-46, unless the taxpayer's
method of accounting is an issue under consideration for a
taxable year under examination within the meaning of
section 3.09(1) of Rev. Proc. 2002-9 when the Form 3115,
Application to Change a Method of Accounting, is filed
with the national office. The IRS has modified Rev. Rul.
2002-46 so that the scope limitations do not apply to a
taxpayer that wants to make the change for its first tax year
ending on or after October 16, 2002, provided the taxpayer's
ethod of accounting for contributions addressed in Rev.
Rul. 2002-46 is not an issue under consideration for tax
years under examination, within the meaning of section
3.09(1) of Rev. Proc. 2002-9, at the time the Form 3115 is
filed with the national office. Moreover, section 6.02(4)(a)
of Rev. Proc. 2002-9 is modified to require that a Form
3115 include the statement: "Automatic Change Filed Under
R v. Rul. 2002-46." Rev. Rul. 2002-73, I.R.B. 2002-45.
ROTH IRA . The taxpayer had a traditional IRA and
rolled over the funds to a Roth IRA. The rolled over funds
were taxable as conversion income and the taxpayer elected
to report the conversion income over four years, under
I.R.C. § 408A(d)(3)(A)(iii). The taxpayer also received
social security benefits but did not include any of the
conversion income for purposes of the tax on social security
benefits. The taxpayer argued that the conversion income
was not actually received by the taxpayer; therefore, it was
not taxable income for social security benefit tax purposes.
The IRS pointed to Treas. Reg. § 1.408A-4, Q&A-9 which
states that distributions from an IRA are income for all
purposes, including the tax on social security benefits. The
court held that the portion of the IRA distribution included
in income in each tax year was to be included in
determining whether the taxpayer’s social security benefits
were subject to tax under I.R.C. § 86. Helm v. Comm’r,
T.C. Summary Op. 2002-138.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME . The taxpayers
owned and operated a cattle ranch. The taxpayers held an
nnual yearling sale of bull and heifer calves. The taxpayers
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claimed that the heifers offered for sale were culled from the
breeding herd as undesirable for their breeding operation;
therefore, the sold calves were held for breeding purposes
only and the sale proceeds were not self-employment
income. The taxpayers sought a summary judgment on the
issue. The court held that summary judgment was not proper
because, although the taxpayers claimed that the sold heifers
were culled, the heifers were advertised as their best heifers
and as “the top of the breed.” Hillman v. United States,
2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,700 (D. S.D. 2002).




AFR 1.82 1.81 1.81 1.80
110 percent AFR2.00 1.99 1.99 1.98
120 percent AFR2.18 2.17 2.16 2.16
Mid-term
AFR 3.06 3.04 3.03 3.02
110 percent AFR 3.37 3.34 3.33 3.32
120 percent AFR3.68 3.65 3.63 3.62
Long-term
AFR 4.60 4.55 4.52 4.51
110 percent AFR 5.07 5.01 4.98 4.96
120 percent AFR 5.53 5.46 5.42 5.40
Rev. Rul. 2002-74, I.R.B. 2002-45.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX- ALM  § 4.06.* Beginning
with the January 2, 2003 payment, the monthly social
security benefit payment is a maximum of $552 for an
individual and $828 for a couple.  The maximum amount of
annual wages subject to Old Age Survivors and Disability
Insurance for 2003 is $87,000, with all wages and self-
employment income subject to the medicare portion of the
tax. For retirees under age 65, the retirement earnings test
exempt amount is $11,520 a year, with $1 withheld for
every $2 in earnings above the limit.
WITHHOLDING . The IRS has issued a notice
reminding taxpayers to review their income tax withholding
statements to insure that sufficient amounts are being
withheld. The reviews should be made if significant
personal or financial changes have occurred such as
marriage, divorce, the birth or adoption of a child, or the
purchase or sale of a home, which may involve the addition
or reduction of exemptions or filing status changes that alter
tax liability, even if no income change took place. Other
changes that may have impact on withholding include
taking a second job, having a nonworking spouse return to
work, receiving income that is not subject to withholding,
becoming self-employed, or being responsible for household
employment taxes. Wage earners can change their
withholding amounts by providing their employers with
new Forms W-4, which indicate marital status, withholding
allowances, and additional amounts that must be withheld.
See IRS Publication 919, “How Do I Adjust My Tax
Withholding.” IR-2002-110.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
LANDLORD’S LIEN. Illinois, in Public Act 92-819,
has amended U.C.C. § 9-316 to provide that a landlord has a
lien on crops grown or growing on leased land to secure the
rent on the land, whether payable in money, goods or
services. Under prior law, the landlord had to file Form
UCC 1 with the Secretary of State in order for the lien to
have priority over other liens on the crops. Under the new
law, the landlord need only provide written notice of the
lease to a purchaser of the crops within six months prior to
the purchase of the crops. A landlord may require a tenant to
provide the name of a purchaser before the sale of the crops.
The statute does not provide a remedy if the tenant sells the
crops without providing the required information. See 735
Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/9-316 as amended by
Public Act 92-819. For a discussion of the changes see
D.L. Uchtmann, The Illinois Landlord’s Lien: Securing
Agricultural Rent Payments after August 21, 2002. Search
for “92-819” at http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu.
ZONING
CATTLE FEEDLOT. After the plaintiff revealed plans
to build a 20,000 head cattle feedlot, members of the public
gathered signatures for an initiative petition to pass a zoning
ordinance which would limit the size of waste management
systems, effectively prohibiting the plaintiff’s feedlot. The
initiative petition was verified and approved. The county
commissioners adopted the zoning ordinance and approved
it for a public vote for final approval. The ordinance was
approved by the vote. The plaintiff challenged the ordinance
as invalid and unenforceable. The court cited Custer City v.
Robinson, 108 N.W.2d 211 (S.D. 1961) which stated that a
public initiative could only enact an ordinance which could
be e acted by the board of county commissioners. Under
S.D. Cod. Laws § 11-2-13, the board of county
commissioners could enact zoning ordinances only to
implement a comprehensive plan. The court found that the
defendant board of commissioners did not have a
comprehensive plan; therefore, the court held that the board
of commissioners and, by extension, the public initiative,
co ld n t enact the zoning ordinance. The court held that the
ordinance was unenforceable as not authorized under S.D.
Cod. Laws § 11-2-13. Heine Farms v. Yankton County,
649 N.W.2d 597 (S.D. 2002).
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FALL SALE - SPECIAL PRICES FOR CURRENT DIGEST SUBSCRIBERS
(Digest subscribers take an extra 10 percent off your total when you purchase two or more items**)
Publication Regular Price Digest Subscriber Price Amt
CD* - Agricultural Law Digest archives of Volumes 1-12, 13(pt) $200 each $175 each
Update subscription for CD    (one per year) for Agricultural Law Digest $75 each $70 each**
BOOK - Agricultural Law Manual—price includes one free update $115 each $100 ea..
Update subscription for book  (3 per year) Agricultural Law Manual $100 / year $90  for one year**
CD* - Agricultural Law Manual $100 each $90 each
Update subscription for CD    (3 per year) for Agricultural Law Manual $90 / year $80 for one year**
Update subscription for CD    (one per year) for Ag icultural Law Manual $80 / year $70 for one year**
CD* – Agricultural Law Manual and Volumes 1-12, 13(pt), Agricultural Law Digest on
CD*
$250 each $225 each
Update subscription for CD    ** (3 per year) for Agricultural Law Manual and
Agricultural Law Digest
$125 / year $115 for one year**
Update subscription for CD    ** (one per year) for Ag icultural Law Manual and
Agricultural Law Digest Archive
$100 / year $90 for one year**
BOOK - Principles of Agricultural Lawby Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl $100 each $90 each
Update subscription for book  (2 per year) for P inciples of Agricultural Law $45 / year $40 for one year**
CD* - Principles of Agricultural Lawby Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl $85 each $75 each
CD* - Principles of Agricultural Law, Agricultural Law Manual and Agricultural Law
Digest archives of Volumes 1-12, 13(pt)
$300 each $275 each
Update subscription for CD    (3 per year) for P inciples of Agricultural Law,
Agricultural Law Manual and Agricultural Law Digest
$150 / year $135 for one year**
Update subscription for CD    (one per year) for Principles of Agricultural Law,
Agricultural Law Manual and Agricultural Law Digest
$125 / year $110 for one year**
SUB TOTAL
Less 10% if purchasing two or more items
TOTAL
Photocopy/print this page and send with your check to  Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405
Enclosed, please find check for $_____________
* The documents on the CDs are in PDF format readable and printable by Adobe Acrobat Reader©, available for all
computer systems. Adobe Acrobat Reader© is  free download from http://www.adobe.com.
** Update subscriptions count as one item if payment for update subscription is included with this order.
